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Workmen's Compensation for Public Employees
in Ohio
The Ohio Workmen's Compensation Act, with some exceptions,
expressly applies to employees of the state, county, city, township,
incorporated village, and school district on a basis of equality with
employees in private enterprise.' The state and its subdivisions fall
within the ambit of the compensation legislation as employers and
must contribute to the public insurance fund.2
One of the most serious problems arising out of workmen's com-
pensation laws generally is that of determining what classes of per-
sons come within the application of the statute as employees." Pub-
lic employment is a phase of that problem and one which has fre-
quently vexed the state courts of the United States. The Ohio act
specifically excludes elected officials from the category of public em-
ployees; 4 city police and firemen may not participate if they are
within the provisions of local pension plans which compensate them
to the same extent as the state compensation act would; the right to
remuneration under a municipal plan diminishes the policemen's or
firemen's right to participate under the same act. 5
Defining "employee" by exclusion and in general terms the
statute6 has left the burden upon the courts in Ohio to determine
in the peripheral cases whether or not one in the service of the state
or one of its subdivisions is a public employee and consequently
compensable. It has been decided that a juror is an employee and
entitled to participate in the public insurance fund when injured
at the courthouse.7 Deputy county officers were held to be em-
ployees,8 while a village marshal was regarded as an "official" as
2 OHIO GEN. CODE §1465-61 (1946).
2 OHIO GEN. CODE §§1465-59, 1465-60, 1465-62 (1946).
3 Esling, The Relationship between Municipal Employment and Work-
men's Compensation, 21 CHI-KENT REV. 209 (1943).
'OHio GEN. CODE §1465-61 (1946).
OHio GEN. CODE §1465-61 (1946). Cases interpreting the police and
firemen exclusion of this provision are: Industrial Commission v. Flynn, 129
Ohio St. 220, 194 N.E. 420 (1935); Industrial Commission v. Cramer, 15
Ohio L. Abs. 408 (1933); City of Columbus v. Thatcher, 16 Ohio L. Abs.
405 (1934); Brown v. Industrial Commission, 34 Ohio L. Abs. 557, 38 N.E.
2d 422 (1941).
6
OHIO GEN. CODE §1465-61 (1946).
71ndustrial Commission v. Rogers, 34 Ohio App. 196, 170 N.E. 600
(1929), aff'd, 122 Ohio St. 134, 171 N.E. 35 (1930). Contra, Board of Com-
missioners v. Evans, 99 Colo. 83, 60 P. 2d 225 (1936).
8 State ex rel. Alcorn v. Beaman, 34 Ohio App. 382, 170 N.E. 877
(1929). North Carolina has adjudged a fee deputy sheriff to be an official
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distinguished from an employee and hence not within the terms of
the act. Also an appraiser in a replevin suit is not within the public
employee status, his compensation being dependent upon the receipt
of costs of the action rather than upon an "appointment or contract
for hire."'1 The uncertainty of payment as a sound basis for a de-
cision against the appraiser is questionable because it does not
negate the fact that the appraiser accepts the appointment with the
expectancy of reimbursement.
A fertile field for workmen's compensation litigation and one
of considerable importance in periods of economic depression is the
status of the relief worker. In spite of the modern conception of
the dignity of labor, many courts have treated the relief worker as
a "pauper" or a "ward of the municipality" and not an employee"
or have held that the service rendered is not under a voluntary
contract for hire, the sub-division being bound by statute to relieve
and support indigent persons.1 2 Ohio, however, early recognized the
relief worker as a public employee by judicial decision,, the su-
preme court stating that "The question is not answered by tech-
nical legal principles.... It must be considered in the light of the
public policy which prompted the [workmen's compensation] legis-
lation involved."' 4 Legislation was thereupon enacted declaratory
of the decision and establishing a special compensation fund for
relief workers.15 The constitutionality of the act creating the special
fund has been upheld.0 Allied with the problem of the relief worker
is that of the convict. Clearly the latter's service is not founded
upon a voluntary appointment or contract for hire, the statutory
prerequisite to the acquisition of employee status. 17 A private act
of the Ohio General Assembly directing the Industrial Commission
to pay workmen's compensation to the dependents of a convict killed
and not an employee, the dissenting judge stating that the decision ren-
dered the deputy nuflius filius. Styers v. Forsyth County, 212 N.C. 558,
565, 194 S.E. 305, 3Q9 (1937).
9 Davis v. Industrial Commission, 54 Ohio App. 453, 7 N.E. 2d 829
(1936).
10 Industrial Commission v. Shaner, 127 Ohio St. 366, 188 N.E. 559
(1933).
11 Horovitz, Current Trends in Basic Prnciples of Workmen's Com-
pensation, 12 LAW Soci.TY JouRNAL 765, 779 (1947).
1"Scordis's Case, 305 Mass. 94, 25 N.E. 2d. 226 (1940); accord, Vaivida
v. City of Grand Rapids, 264 Mich. 204, 249 N.W. 826 (1933).
3 Industrial Commission v. McWhorter, 129 Ohio St. 40, 193 N.E. 620
(1934); accord, Hendershot v. City of Lincoln, 136 Neb. 606, 286 N.W. 909
(1939).
"4 Industrial Commission v. McWhorter, supra note 13.
IS Omo GEN. CODE §3496-1 et seq. (1937).
16 State ex rel. Slaughter v. Industrial Commission, 132 Ohio St. 537,
545, 9 N.E. 2d 505, 509 (1937).
3
7 OHio GEN. CODE §1465-61 (1946).
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while performing duties assigned by prison officials was deemed
unconstitutional by the Attorney General on the ground that the
state does not "employ" convicts.1 s But it would be reasonable to
allow compensation to convicts in fact employed outside of prison
by a private employer, or "borrowed" by a particular state depart-
ment even though the service rendered is not strictly voluntary. 9
There have been divergent views as to the compensability of
a school superintendent in Ohio. The Attorney General resolved
that the superintendent is a public official and not an employee on
the ground that the courts had permitted quo warranto proceedings
against him and that action lies only against public officials.
20
Shortly thereafter a court of appeals overruled this determination,
holding that the superintendent was a functionary of the school
board exercising no independent sovereign resolution and therefore
merely an employee.2'
It has never been doubted in Ohio that public school teachers
and professors of state and municipal universities are public em-
ployees. But the problem of "course of employment" and "arising
out of employment" 22 has presented some difficulty. The supreme
court held in Inglish v. Industrial Commission23 that the dependents
of a school teacher killed while returning home after school hours
with examination papers to be graded at home were entitled to
compensation, that the teacher was in the course of, and the death
arose out of his employment. This decision stood in opposition to
the general rule obtaining in Ohio that injury suffered in going to
or returning from the place of employment does not arise out of
the employment. 24 The court expressly overruled the Inglish case
two years later stating that there was no causal connection between
the injury sustained and the employment notwithstanding the fact
that the teacher performs some pedagogic duties at home.2 5 How-
ever attendance at a teachers' institute at the request and direction
of the school superintendent is within the course of employment.26
is 1915 Ops. ATT'Y. GEN. (Ohio) No. 383. See Greene's Case, 280 Mass.
506, 182 N.E. 857 (1932).
19 Horovitz, Current Trends in Basic Principles of Workmen's Com-
pensation, 12 LAw SOCIETY JOURNAL 765, 781 (1947).
20 1942 OPs. ATT'Y. GEN. (Ohio) No. 5168.
21 Anderson v. Industrial Commission, 74 Ohio App. 77, 57 N.E. 2d
620 (1943).
22See Walborn v. General Fireproofing Co., 147 Ohio St. 507, 72 N.E.
2d 95 (1947), 9 OHIO ST. L. J. 184.
23 125 Ohio St. 494, 182 N.E. 31 (1932).
2442 OHIo JuR. 632 (1936).
5Industrial Commission v. Gintert, 128 Ohio St. 129, 190 N.E. 400
(1934).
2r Bower v. Industrial Commission, 61 Ohio App. 469, 22 N.E. 2d 840
(1939).
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Likewise where a college professor's duties expressly include lec-
tures and addresses at Ohio high schools in furtherance of the uni-
versity's prestige, death suffered from an infectious thorn of a rose
pinned to the professor's lapel by admiring students is within the
scope and arising out of the employment. 27 However a later At-
torney General's opinion2 8 held that an Ohio State University pro-
fessor injured at a national educational meeting during summer
vacation may not be compensated; it was stated that such injury
does not arise out of the employment because it is "not required
or contemplated" by the contract of employment, thus distinguish-
ing the situation from the preceding case. It is arguable however
that an Ohio State professor receives payment for his services on
the basis of a twelve month year and that there is an implied obli-
gation in his contract to keep abreast of new developments in his
field through attendance at meetings of his colleagues.
One of the chief sources of litigation under the Ohio act has
been in the area which might be termed casual public service. For
example, is a person called upon by a sheriff or a police officer to
assist in an arrest or other emergency an employee of the subdiv-
ision? Overruling an earlier determination by the Attorney Gen-
eral, 0 a court of appeals decided that such an informally deputized
person was an employee, a deputy de jure, and his dependents
eligible to participate in the insurance fund when he was killed
while helping a regular deputy sheriff apprehend a criminal.3 1 Previ-
ously the supreme court had held that one injured while aiding a
village patrolman upon request in routine investigations was not an
employee of the village;3 2 but this case was distinguished because
no emergency existed, a condition precedent to enlisting the aid of
a private citizen as a temporary employee. 3 The question arose
again recently in Stoeckel v. Industria Commissions' wherein it
was held that a bystander who responded to a general call of a
police officer of the city to "stop that man" was not an employee of
the city entitled to compensation. The court reasoned that a statute
providing for a fine upon a private citizen for refusing to heed an
27 Industrial Commission v. Davison, 118 Ohio St. 180, 160 N.E. 693
(1928).
28 1934 Ops. ATT'y Gm. (Ohio) No. 2988.
29 OHIo GEN. CODE §§2833, 12857 (1937).
30 1933 Ops. ATr'y GE~r. (Ohio) No. 85.
31 Mitchell v. Industrial Commission, 57 Ohio App. 319, 13 N.E. 2d
736 (1936).
3 2 Industrial Commission v. Turek, 129 Ohio St. 545, 196 N.E. 382
(1935).
33 Mitchell v. Industrial Commission, 57 Ohio App. 319, 323, 13 N.E.
2d 736, 738 (1936).
4 77 Ohio App. 159, 66 N.E. 2d 776 (1945)
1948]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
officer's call for aid35 is purely penal and cannot be the basis for the
relationship of employer and employee. The code provision specifi-
cally creating the power to draft private citizens applies only to
sheriffs and not to city police. 6 Volunteer firemen of an incorpo-
rated village have been deemed to be employees for purposes of
workmen's compensation by specific statute37 the same as though
regularly employed. Without statutory guidance, it seems that a
contract for hire exists and therefore an employee status. However
compensation is computed not on total weekly earnings from all
sources but only on the basis of average weekly payment from the
village for services as a volunteer fireman.38 The attorney general
has concluded that where a village has established a pension plan
for volunteer firemen the compensation from such a fund shall be
in diminution of the right to compensation from the state insurance
fund. In effect this applies the statutory restriction on benefits to
city police and firemen to the village volunteer fireman. Ohio has
not faced the scope of employment problem with relation to the
volunteer fireman but the Nebraska supreme court held that injury
in the volunteer's home while hastening to respond to an alarm
was not in the course of or arising out of his employment.41 It is not
beyond the realm of reason however to say that there was a causal
connection between the injury and the employment. California has
dealt with the casual employment of an election officer appointed
to serve at a general election and has found him to be an employee.
Because the nature rather than the length of the employment is
controlling in Ohio4- it is probable that Ohio would hold in accord
with the California case. Still in the area of casual public service
are the large numbers of national guardsmen under state authority
in the time of peace. Apparently injury to a guardsman has not
been a subject of workmen's compensation litigation in Ohio 3 as it
35 OHio GEN. CODE §12857 (1937).
36 OHio GEN. CODE §2833 (1937).
37 Oio GEN. CODE §3298-57 (1937). See OEIo GEN. CODE §3298-60
(1937) granting compensation coverage where fire fighting is beyond the
corporate limits of the village.
38 State ex rel. Smith v. Industrial Commission, 127 Ohio St. 217, 187
N.E. 768 (1933).
39 1940 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. (Ohio) No. 2520.
4 OHiO GEN. CODE §1465-61 (1946).
43Henry v. Village of Coleridge, 147 Neb. 686, 24 N.W. 2d 922 (1946),
32 IowA L. REV. 802 (1947).
42 State ex rel. Bettman v. Christen, 128 Ohio St. 56, 190 N.E. 233
(1934).
'I The office of the Adjutant General of Ohio states that compensa-
tion to Ohio national guardsmen is by private enactment of the General
Assembly.
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has been in other states where a split of authority has resulted as
to his status. 44
An independent contractor as distinguished from an employee
is not entitled to participate under the Ohio act whether engaged
for public45 or private46 endeavor. But one renting buses to a school
board and receiving a portion of his reimbursement for supervision
of the drivers and maintenance of the vehicles has the co-existing
functions of an independent contractor and an employee and is com-
pensable.47
Ohio has espoused a policy of liberal construction in workmen's
compensation with respect to the eligibility of public employees to
benefits from the state fund.48 It appears from the cases that the
courts have generally adhered to that policy. Since the basic aim
of workmen's compensation legislation is to place the burden of safe
working conditions on the employer, it is meritorious that Ohio
has followed such a policy as to the public employee. The govern-
mental unit as an employer should be bound by the philosophy of
workmen's compensation just as the private employer is bound in
view of the fact that the public service represents a sizeable part of
the country's manpower.49 The protection afforded Ohio's public
servants by both the judicial and the legislative departments of the
government is extensive, and compares favorably with that afforded
by other states.5 0
James T. Lynn, Jr.
13 A.L.R. 1251 (1921); 150 A.L.R. 1456 (1944).
45 Industrial Commission v. McAdow, 126 Ohio St. 198, 184 N.E. 759
(1933) (court house interior decorator); Industrial Commission v. Hen-
derson, 43 Ohio App. 20, 182 N.E. 603 (1932) (resurfacing bridge).
46 Coviello v. Industrial Commission, 129 Ohio St. 589, 196 N.E. 661
(1935) (taxi driver). For other cases, see A.DAMs AND RAPP, OHIo IN us-
TRIAL COMMISSION CASES (.1942).
47 George v. Industrial Commission, 26. Ohio L. Abs. 10 (1937).48ndustrial Commission v. Rogers, 34 Ohio App.. 196, 198, 170 N.E.
600 (1929), affd, 122 Ohio St. 134, 171 N.E. 35 (1930).
4 9 MAGNUSSON, WoREx's COMPENSATION FOR PUBLIc E VPLOYEES (Pub-
lic Administration Service No. 8, 1944).
50 Esling, The Relationship between-Municipal Emiployment and Work-
men's Compensation, 21 CHI-KENT L. REv. 209 (1943).
1948]
